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Meta-analyses of the determinants and outcomes of belief in climate change 
 
 
Abstract 
Recent growth in the number of studies examining belief in climate change is a positive 
development, but presents an ironic challenge in that it can be difficult for academics, 
practitioners and policy makers to keep pace. As a response to this challenge, the current 
paper reports the first meta-analysis of the correlates of belief in climate change. Twenty-
seven variables were examined by synthesizing 25 polls and 171 academic studies across 56 
nations. Two broad conclusions emerged. First, many intuitively appealing variables (such as 
education, sex, subjective knowledge, and experience of extreme weather events) were 
overshadowed in predictive power by values, ideologies, worldviews and political 
orientation. Second, climate change beliefs have only a small relationship with the extent to 
which people are willing to act in climate-friendly ways. Implications for converting skeptics 
to the climate change cause – and for converting believers’ intentions into action – are 
discussed. 
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Meta-analyses of the determinants and outcomes of belief in climate change 
 
 A critical mass of people is skeptical that anthropogenic climate change is real, 
something that has long been identified as an obstacle to mitigation efforts.1-4 It is not 
surprising, then, that there has been a concerted effort to examine the variables that are 
associated with acceptance of (and skepticism about) anthropogenic climate change. The 
insights associated with this research endeavor are important for a number of reasons, not 
least of which is that they lay the groundwork for future interventions. 
 The expansion of this research frontier is so quick that it can be difficult for 
academics, practitioners and policy makers to keep pace. Furthermore, relevant research has 
splintered across a large set of disciplines, including psychology, communication, sociology, 
political science, agriculture, climate science, and media studies. This is a positive 
development in that it allows for vibrant cross-pollination of theories, methods and 
assumptions. But it also creates challenges for consumers of the research, given that (a) it is 
easy to miss relevant research in areas unrelated to one’s own, and (b) definitions and 
measures can vary substantially across disciplines, making it difficult to identify coherent 
messages. 
 In response to these challenges, the current paper reports the first meta-analytic 
examination of the demographic and psychological correlates of belief in climate change. The 
strength of the meta-analytic approach is its ability to rise above the churn of individual 
studies and to extract broad themes. As such, it provides a comprehensive overview of who 
endorses or opposes the reality of climate change and the main reasons they do so. Such an 
analysis draws on the energies of hundreds of individual climate researchers, but in a way 
that distils simple and digestible insights for academics, practitioners and policy makers.  
 Below we report the results of meta-analyses summarizing the relationship between 
climate change belief and 7 demographic variables (Fig. 1), 13 psychological variables that 
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according to theory should be antecedents of climate change belief (Fig. 2), and 7 variables 
widely considered to be downstream consequences of climate change belief (Fig. 3). We 
acknowledge that most of the studies are correlational in nature, so although the distinction 
between antecedents and consequences are based on theoretical considerations, some 
relationships may be bidirectional. Statistics for the 27 meta-analyses are summarized in 
Table 1. 
Results 
Demographics and beliefs 
 The largest demographic correlate of climate change belief is political affiliation. 
People who intend to vote for more liberal political parties are more likely to believe in 
climate change than those who align themselves with relatively conservative political parties. 
The tendency for (conservative) Republicans to express more skepticism than (liberal) 
Democrats has long been identified within the U.S., and has been credited with contributing 
to a growing ideological gulf between skeptics and non-skeptics.5-8 The current data further 
implicate political alignments in acceptance of climate change; its effect is roughly double 
the size of any other demographic variable.  
 The link between climate change beliefs and political ideology (i.e., the extent to 
which people report being liberal or conservative, reported along a continuous scale and 
measured independently of voting intention) is also significant but less strong. This suggests 
that acceptance of climate change is more aligned to specific identification with political 
parties than to underlying political ideologies. 
 Relatively small effects were found for the other demographic variables: age, 
education, income, race, and sex. People with stronger beliefs in climate change were 
younger, more educated, higher income, and more likely to be white and female, but these 
effects were muted. Although a “conservative white male” profile has emerged of climate 
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change skeptics in the U.S.9, our analysis of polls across multiple nations suggest that the 
“conservative” part of that equation would seem to be more diagnostic than the “white male” 
part.  
Antecedents of beliefs 
 Knowledge: Early studies showed skeptics to have levels of scientific knowledge that 
were roughly equivalent to those of non-skeptics.10,11 These studies, however, measured 
participants’ subjective perception of their own expertise (subjective knowledge) leading 
some to argue that it would be more diagnostic to measure people’s awareness of objectively 
verifiable facts (objective knowledge).12 Our analysis suggests that belief in climate change is 
stronger the greater people’s subjective and objective knowledge, but consistent with 
theorists’ intuitions the association is stronger for objective knowledge than for subjective 
knowledge (see Fig. 2). It should be noted, though, that these main effects may be qualified 
by a moderated effect: research in the U.S. using representative samples suggest that the link 
between (subjective) knowledge and belief is strongly positive among Democrats and 
Independents, but negligible among Republicans.11,13 Such observations reinforce arguments 
that knowledge-related variables may be shaped by, or trumped by, ideological factors.14-17 
 Beliefs about science: In the face of very high complexity, people are prone to make 
judgments using cognitive heuristics, or “rules of thumb”, rather than systematically 
reviewing evidence. Two interrelated heuristics have been implicated in climate change 
belief: a source heuristic (“scientists are trustworthy so the scientific orthodoxy must be 
true”)11 and a consensus heuristic (“there is scientific consensus around climate change, and 
consensus implies correctness”).18-20 As can be seen in Fig. 2, belief in climate change was 
stronger the more people endorsed these heuristics, representing the second- and third-largest 
psychological predictors of climate change belief. 
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 Concern for the environment: It makes intuitive sense that people concerned about 
the environment’s vulnerability will be more attentive to the dangers of climate change, and 
may use a precautionary principle in weighing up the levels of evidence (“if there is a chance 
that climate change is real then it is enough of a reason to act”). One of the most widely used 
constructs in the environmental psychology literature is the New Ecological Paradigm 
(NEP)21, a scale that is weighted heavily with items about the fragility of the environment and 
the importance of minimizing humanity’s impact on it. Although the scale does not mention 
climate change, belief in climate change tends to be stronger the higher people endorse the 
NEP. Indeed, this relationship was the strongest of all the variables. 
 We also identified 16 studies that measured whether people have a “green” or activist 
identity with regard to the environment. Although such an identity may reflect many things, it 
can be interpreted as a reflection of what happens when concern for the environment becomes 
embedded as an important social category in one’s self-concept. Unsurprisingly, the stronger 
people’s green identity the stronger their acceptance of climate change. The fact that the 
positive relationship was relatively weak may partly reflect the fact that some people perceive 
stigma around activist identities, and so would rather construe their concern in terms of their 
personal values rather than as a social identity.  
  Values and ideologies: There is a vast body of research examining how social 
attitudes are influenced by underlying ideologies, worldviews, and values, and increasingly 
this approach has been applied to understanding climate change beliefs. Drawing on 
Schwartz’s22 theory of universal values, Stern and colleagues23 identified a set of specifically 
biospheric values that relate to protecting the environment. Fig. 2 confirms that placing a 
high importance on the natural environment is associated with believing climate change is 
real, showing a small to moderate effect size.  
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 Another influential theory is Cultural Cognition (adapted from Douglas’s Cultural 
Theory)24, which argues that people’s perceptions of risk are influenced by their concept of 
how society should be structured and that this conceptualization leads them to uphold specific 
cultural values.16,25 For example, people who subscribe to relatively individualistic and 
hierarchical values are more inclined to value elites and the status quo and so are motivated to 
disbelieve that industry poses a risk to the environment. In contrast, people who subscribe to 
relatively egalitarian and communitarian values are more likely to have a moral suspicion of 
industry, and so are motivated to embrace the risk that industry presents to the environment. 
These propositions are supported by the data: belief in climate change is lower the more 
people adopt hierarchical and individualistic cultural values. 
 Another ideology that has been implicated in climate change beliefs is free-market 
ideology, which maintains that the forces of supply and demand should be freed from 
interventions by regulating authorities. Some scholars have argued that free-market 
ideologies underpin a range of conspiratorial and skeptical beliefs about science, including 
climate change skepticism.26,27 Our analysis of studies that measure both free-market 
ideology and climate change beliefs lends support for this notion. 
 Situational cues: A growing research tradition has examined whether people’s 
climate change beliefs are sensitive to direct experiences of weather and other proximal 
environmental cues. Since researchers first pointed to the fact that British people affected by 
floods were more likely to believe in climate change28, there is now a critical mass of studies 
to gauge whether there is a more general link between climate change belief and experience 
of extreme weather events. Although significant, the relationship is negligible in size. 
 Other studies have focused on whether people who experience changes in the local 
weather over time are more likely to believe in climate change. Some of these studies use 
objective weather data (e.g., fluctuations in temperatures over the previous year) whereas 
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others measure perceptions of such changes. When gathering these data we were careful to 
exclude items that used the term “climate change” or “change in the climate” as part of the 
measure, to avoid circularity between this predictor and our criterion variable. However, 
some conceptual overlap is somewhat unavoidable in operationalizing this construct, and it 
cannot be ruled out that this would have inflated the relatively large positive correlation with 
climate change belief.  
 Finally, a set of experimental studies have drawn on the social psychological literature 
on subliminal priming to examine whether priming people with environmental cues of 
climate change (e.g., turning up the heat in the laboratory; placing dead trees around 
participants) has an effect on their belief in climate change. The observed link between these 
inductions and climate change belief are significant, perhaps surprisingly so given that their 
impact is unconscious. 
 Consequences of beliefs 
 A presumed outcome of believing that (anthropogenic) climate change is real is that 
people will be motivated to engage in pro-environmental behaviors that help mitigate climate 
change. Our coding distinguished between subjective ratings of future intentions and ratings 
of actual behaviors. As can be seen in Fig. 3, the more people believe in climate change the 
stronger their pro-environmental intentions and behaviors, but the relationship was stronger 
for intentions than for behaviors. This is not surprising given that intentions are less 
compromised by practical reality constraints than are behaviors, and so the relationship 
between beliefs and intentions is more “pure”. 
 In our coding we also distinguished between public-sphere and private-sphere pro-
environmental behaviors and intentions, using a taxonomy by Stern.29 Examples of public-
sphere acts include petitioning on environmental issues and contributing to environmental 
organizations. Examples of private-sphere acts include individual energy reduction strategies 
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and recycling. Interestingly, the gulf between intentions and behaviors observed earlier was 
more pronounced in the private-sphere than the public-sphere behaviors. This may reflect the 
fact that some of the public-sphere behaviors may not be as influenced by reality constraints 
as private-sphere behaviors (e.g., whether one takes public transport may depend on transport 
availability).  
 In our review we noted a critical mass of studies that focused on support for public 
policies that help mitigate against climate change. Within this broad category we identified 
three categories of studies which varied in how concretely the policy measures were 
described. At the most abstract level were studies asking people to reflect on the tradeoff 
between the environment and the economy. Perhaps unsurprisingly, higher willingness to 
prioritize the environment over the economy was associated with higher acceptance of 
climate change. Other studies focused on support for specific public policies such as 
promoting alternative energies or creating green policies within organizations (“policy 
support” in Fig. 3). Here, the link with climate change beliefs was also significant and 
positive, but less so than when studies asked about the principle of prioritizing the 
environment over the economy. We also identified 31 studies that measured acceptance of 
climate change and support for mitigation policies that place a price on carbon (carbon tax or 
cap and trade); enough so that we analyzed these studies as a discrete category. The positive 
link is intuitive but only small to moderate in size. It is noteworthy that the link between these 
various indices of policy support and climate change beliefs get smaller the more specific and 
concrete the measure of policy support, and the more the measure implies personal cost on 
behalf of the respondent. 
Moderation Analyses 
 Table 1 reveals reasonably high levels of variation in the strength of effects of 
individual studies within our meta-analyses that cannot be explained by random error. To 
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help identify why this variability exists, we conducted moderation analyses designed to test 
whether the strength of effects systematically differed across various conditions. Specifically, 
we performed separate meta-regressions examining three types of moderators: the type of 
climate change measure used; whether the sample was from the USA; and the extent of 
climate change contributions in the country where the sample was drawn.   
 Type of measure. Effect sizes for six constructs were significantly moderated by 
whether climate change was measured with reference to causes (i.e., anthropogenic climate 
change; k=40 studies) or more generally (k=131). The pattern was mixed: The effects of 
environmental cues (β=.50, df=14, p=.022) and subjective knowledge (β=.84, df=32, 
p<.001) were stronger when climate change was measured without reference to being 
anthropogenic. In contrast, the effects of public pro-environmental behavior (β=-.44, df=22, 
p=.026), public pro-environmental intentions (β=-.47, df=43, p=.002), private pro-
environmental intentions (β=-.49, df=64, p<.001), and support for a carbon tax (β=-.38, 
df=30, p=.003) were stronger when anthropogenic climate change was measured. This last 
cluster of effects makes sense: Individual action to mitigate climate change is more likely 
when one believes that climate change is not only happening, but is caused by human 
activity. Measures of anthropogenic climate change are more likely to pick up on this nuance. 
 Nationality of sample. Moderation analysis compared U.S. studies (48% of the 
sample) with non-U.S. studies. Three relationships were stronger in the U.S. samples: public 
pro-environmental intentions (β=-.41, df=43, p=.008), support for a carbon tax (β=-.62, 
df=30, p<.001), and willingness to prioritize the environment over the economy (β=-.53, 
df=19, p=.003). Two relationships were stronger in the non-US samples: subjective 
knowledge (β=.43, df=32, p=.001), and free-market ideology (β=.47, df=29, p=.011)  
 Climate change contributions. It is plausible that climate change beliefs could be 
linked to the extent to which a country was a significant contributor to climate change. We 
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ran moderation analyses examining whether the strength of effects across studies was 
correlated with the climate change subscale of the Environmental Performance Index.31 Only 
one significant effect emerged: The stronger the environmental performance of the sample 
nation in terms of emissions and renewables, the stronger was the relationship between 
climate change belief and objective knowledge (β=.43, df=16, p=.007), suggesting that 
national-level performance might trickle down to individual level knowledge and 
understanding (or vice versa). 
Implications 
 One message from the data is that traditional societal faultlines of gender, age, sex, 
race, and income seem to be of little relevance in determining levels of climate change 
skepticism. This is not to say there aren’t important lessons that can be extracted from 
examining these demographics, and these variables can interact with psychological variables 
in meaningful ways. But these demographics shared only trivial relationships with climate 
change belief, as did education, (subjective) knowledge, and experience with extreme 
weather events. 
 Indeed, these intuitively appealing determinants of climate change belief were 
overshadowed in predictive power by values, ideologies and political orientation. Consistent 
with the reasoning of many theorists in this area, the data suggest that “evidence” around 
climate change is searched, remembered, and assimilated in a way that dovetails with 
people’s own political loyalties and their worldviews. For some, this may lead to a disregard 
for (or misunderstanding of) the scientific consensus around climate change. In the face of 
this, one can argue that there are limits to the extent to which skeptics can be “converted” 
through facts and explication alone, and it is equally implausible that climate scientists can 
change people’s underlying values and political allegiances. Instead, some have argued that 
pro-environmental behaviors can be coaxed out of people by working with their ideologies 
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rather than against them; for example by framing pro-environmental action as a form of 
patriotism32 or as an investment in “green” technologies.33,34 
 In terms of the consequences, a salient message from the data is that climate change 
beliefs have only a modest impact on the extent to which people are willing to act in climate-
friendly ways. When phrased in abstract ways (e.g., the willingness to prioritize the 
environment over the economy) the link with climate change beliefs is relatively strong. But 
when more specific policies are probed the relationship shrinks, and when policy support is 
specifically measured with respect to putting a price on carbon it shrinks again. A similar 
shrinkage occurs when one compares intentions and behaviors: belief in climate change has a 
solid relationship with the extent to which people aspire to behave in climate-friendly ways, 
but a small-to-moderate relationship with the extent to which people “walk the talk”. 
Overall, these findings show the benefit of moving beyond the question of “who” 
disbelieves that climate change is real (e.g., conservatives) to the psychological factors that 
help explain “why” people hold their views about climate change. The findings offer some 
hope because psychological factors are more susceptible to targeted interventions than are 
demographic constructs. Certainly, the challenge remains great, as climate change beliefs are 
influenced by distal psychological and political beliefs that shape people’s assimilation of 
“the facts”. Yet by showing which constructs are most systematically and strongly associated 
with climate change beliefs across studies, we hope to provide the research community with 
the best information about how to mobilize and target their efforts. 
  
13 
 
Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to the first author. 
Acknowledgements 
We thank Julie Henry and Julian Higgins for their helpful advice on a previous version of this 
paper. We also thank Essential Research for providing access to their polling data. Finally, 
we thank the dozens of authors of papers included in the meta-analyses who provided data 
and helped clarify their analyses. 
Author Contributions 
M.H. conceived and designed the meta-analyses, and led the writing.  E.H. gathered and 
analyzed the data, and co-wrote the paper.  P.B. and K.F. contributed expertise in terms of 
materials and analysis tools, contributed to the design of the meta-analysis, and co-wrote the 
paper. 
Competing Financial Interests 
The authors declare no competing financial interests. 
Figure Legends 
Figure 1. Correlations between climate change belief and demographic variables. Sex is coded male = 
0, female = 1; race was coded as 1=White, 2=Non-White. Higher scores on the political affiliation and 
political ideology represent more “left-wing” voting intentions and ideologies respectively. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Figure 2. Correlations between antecedent variables and climate change belief. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Figure 3. Correlations between climate change belief and outcome variables. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals.  
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Table1: Data summary 
  Correlation  Q (total heterogeneity) 
k (number of 
studies) I
2 T2 
Demographics 
Sex 0.029 59.42 25 59.61 0.001
Age -0.125 178.38 25 86.55 0.003
Income 0.057 21.03 23 0.00 0.000
Education 0.117 109.80 22 80.87 0.002
Race 0.032 8.08 12 0.00 0.000
Political affiliation 0.301 68.01 20 72.06 0.004 
Political ideology 0.149 338.20 30 91.43 0.015
Antecedents of climate change beliefs
Objective knowledge 0.253 383.28 17 95.83 0.033 
Subjective knowledge 0.182 459.36 33 93.03 0.012 
Trust in scientists 0.365 359.51 23 93.88 0.019
Perceived scientific 
consensus 0.349 427.92 30 93.22 0.016 
New environmental 
paradigm 0.493 547.63 38 93.24 0.035 
Activist/green 
identity 0.229 458.95 16 96.73 0.026 
Biospheric values 0.252 46.52 6 89.25 0.009
Individualistic 
cultural values -0.275 150.63 14 91.37 0.010 
Hierarchical cultural 
values -0.258 102.94 16 85.43 0.006 
Free-market ideology -0.296 242.43 30 88.04 0.018 
Experience of 
extreme weather 0.052 28.44 9 71.87 0.002 
15 
 
Experience of local 
weather change 0.336 446.91 17 96.42 0.042 
Environmental cues 0.219 97.56 15 85.65 0.018 
Consequences of climate change beliefs
Public pro-env. 
intentions 0.251 751.13 44 94.28 0.019 
Private pro-env. 
intentions 0.316 1105.55 65 94.21 0.023 
Public pro-env. 
behaviour 0.188 155.86 23 85.88 0.007 
Private pro-env. 
behaviour 0.173 857.14 38 95.68 0.018 
Policy support 0.324 681.48 25 96.48 0.030
Support for carbon 
tax/cap & trade 0.207 290.47 31 89.67 0.014 
Willingness to 
prioritize 
environment over 
economy 
0.384 180.88 20 89.50 0.009 
Note. All correlations are pooled effects, and are significant at p<.005. Q-statistics were derived using 
a random-effects model, and were significant at p<.01 for every variable except income and race. 
Demographic data were based on polls from five research organizations. All five measured sex and 
age. Education was measured by Essential, Pew, Eurobarometer, and UK Department of Energy; 
income was measured by Essential, Pew, and UK Department of Energy; political affiliation was 
measured by Pew and Essential; political ideology was measured by Pew and ISSP; and race was 
measured by Pew, coded as 1=White, 2=Non-White.  
Q=total variance, I2=proportion of variability due to heterogeneity between studies rather than 
sampling error, T2=between-study variance. 
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Method 
   Choosing variables. In deciding which correlates of climate change belief to include 
in the meta-analyses we were guided by two criteria. One criterion was whether there was a 
critical mass of studies to allow for reliable conclusions to be drawn. With this in mind, all 
the variables selected for the meta-analyses were assessed in five or more data sets. The 
second criterion was whether the variable was theoretically relevant to climate change 
beliefs, but conceptually independent of believing climate change is real. Some widely-
researched variables pre-suppose that the participant believes in climate change (e.g., 
perceptions of risk presented by climate change; perceptions of efficacy about mitigating 
climate change) and to avoid circularity we did not examine these variables. Readers 
interested in finding out more about these variables can draw on recent reviews.35,36 
 Sampling data sets. When examining the relationship between demographic 
variables and climate change beliefs it is important to draw on data sets that use 
representative, stratified samples. Although there is academic literature that also uses these 
sampling techniques, we decided to base our observations on data by established polling 
companies and government agencies whose job it is to conduct large-scale, accurate polling 
of the broad population. These data are based on five major research organizations that 
measured belief in climate change: Pew Research (12 polls conducted in the U.S. 2006-
2013), U.K. Department of Energy and Climate Change (three polls conducted among British 
participants 2012-2014), International Social Survey Programme: Environment III (ISSP, 
conducted across 32 countries in 2010); Essential Research (eight polls conducted among 
Australians 2010-2014), and Eurobarometer (conducted within 30 European nations by the 
European Commission in 2009).  
 For the remaining constructs – the thirteen psychological antecedents and seven 
consequences - we sampled from papers published in academic outlets on or before April 
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2014. We sampled any studies that (quantitatively) measured both belief in climate change 
and one of the 20 correlates included in the analysis. Most of these data sets were collected 
by academics for the purpose of their study, but some involved secondary analyses of larger 
data sets collected by research companies or government agencies.  To prevent the same 
dataset and statistics being incorporated multiple times, we excluded studies that reported 
statistics for the same variables using the same dataset.  Information about the search strategy 
- with details about how the final sample of 171 studies was identified - are provided in the 
PRISMA diagram in the supplementary materials. A summary of all the studies sampled, 
with a complete bibliography, can also be found in supplementary materials.  
 Analytic strategy. Meta-analyses were conducted using Comprehensive Meta-
Analysis software. 30 Correlation coefficients were converted to Z-scores and then back-
transformed for reporting. Because zero-order correlations (transformed) were used, we 
applied the standard weighting (n-3). We used random-effects meta-analysis to identify the 
average correlations across studies, weighted by the size of the samples. It should be noted that 
we examined each construct separately using separate random-effects meta-analyses, so direct 
statistical comparisons between effect sizes across constructs were not made.  
 In addition to average effects, indicators of variation across samples are also shown in 
Table 1. The Q statistic tests whether the amount of variation in effect sizes across studies 
occurs by chance. The I2 statistic shows the proportion of this variation attributed to “true” 
differences in effect sizes across studies (with the remaining variation attributable to random 
error), with .25 indicating a low proportion, .50 a moderate proportion, and .75 a high 
proportion.30 We include T2 in the table for reference purposes as it represents the actual 
variance in true effects across studies. Meta regressions were performed separately for each 
variable showing moderate/ high proportions of “true” cross study variation, using a meta-
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regression macro for the SPSS statistical program37, with a random effects model and 
“method of moments” estimation.  
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(Psychology-based literature search)
PsycINFO and PsycARTICLES
Search: Any Field: "climate change" OR Any 
Field: "global warming" OR Any Field: 
"greenhouse effect" AND Year: 1980 TO 2014
AND Peer-Reviewed Journals Only
Searched March 20 2014.
(n = 1,140)
(General literature search)
Scopus Search
Search: ABS(attitude OR perception OR belief) 
AND (ABS("climate change") OR ABS("global 
warming") OR ABS("greenhouse effect")) AND 
(LIMIT-TO(DOCTYPE, "ar")) AND (LIMIT-
TO(LANGUAGE, "English"))
Searched April 17 2014.
(n = 1,502)
(Additional records)
Unpublished data (request for unpublished data 
sent via email list-serves from psychological 
science and environmental science 
organizations) AND additional records 
identified by authors via personal 
communication.
(n = 42)
Records after duplicates removed
(n = 2,554)
Full-text articles assessed for eligibility 
(n = 383)
Studies included in meta-analysis
k = 171
Records excluded as they did not 
contain measure of belief in climate 
change
(n = 2,171)
Full-text articles excluded
(n = 212)
Reasons:
-Article included measure of climate 
change belief but did not measure 
antecedents or consequences
-Data not provided by authors so 
relevant analyses could not be 
conducted
-Same data reported across multiple 
articles
Supplementary Figure 1.
PRISMA flow diagram describing decision rules for identification, screening, eligibility, and inclusion
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 	  Free‐market	ideology ǦͲǤ͵͹Ͳ Ͷ͵Ͷ
 New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤ͸1Ͳ Ͷ͵Ͷ
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤͶ͹1 Ͷ͵Ͷ
 
  Free‐market	ideology ǦͲǤʹ͵Ͳ Ͷʹ͹
 New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤͷͺͲ Ͷ1͹
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤͶͶͷ Ͷʹ͹
   Free‐market	ideology ǦͲǤʹͺͲ ͶʹͲ
 New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤͷͻͲ ͶʹͲ
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤ͵ʹ1 ͶʹͲ
   Free‐market	ideology ǦͲǤʹͻͲ Ͷ1ͺ
 New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤͶ1Ͳ Ͷ1ͺ
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤ͵ʹ͸ Ͷ1͹
ǟɥƐƎƏ6ɥ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ͻ

 ȋȌ  Free‐market	ideology ǦͲǤͲͷͲ ʹʹ͵
 New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤ͵ʹͲ ʹʹ1
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤ1ͺͷ ʹʹ1
   Free‐market	ideology ǦͲǤʹͺͲ ʹͷͲ
 New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤͷ1Ͳ ʹͶͻ
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤ͵ͺ͸ ʹͷͲ
   Free‐market	ideology ǦͲǤʹ͸Ͳ Ͷ͵ͻ
 New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤͷͺͲ Ͷ͵ͻ
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤʹͻ͸ Ͷ͵ͻ
   Free‐market	ideology ǦͲǤͲͶͲ Ͷ1Ͳ
 New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤͲͷͲ Ͷ1Ͳ
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤͲ͸ͷ Ͷ1Ͳ
   Free‐market	ideology ǦͲǤʹ͵Ͳ ͶͲͲ
 New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤͷ͹Ͳ ͶͲͲ
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤ͵1Ͳ ͵ͻͻ
   Free‐market	ideology ǦͲǤʹͻͲ ͶͲͷ
 New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤͶͻͲ ͶͲͷ
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤͶʹ1 ͶͲͷ
   Free‐market	ideology ǦͲǤʹͻͲ Ͷ11
 New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤͷ͵Ͳ Ͷ11
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤͶͲ͹ Ͷ11
   Free‐market	ideology ǦͲǤ͵1Ͳ Ͷ1ʹ
 New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤͷ͹Ͳ Ͷ1ʹ
ǟɥƐƎƏ6ɥ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1Ͳ

 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤͶ1͸ Ͷ1ʹ
   Free‐market	ideology ǦͲǤ1ͲͲ Ͷ1͸
 New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤ͵ͺͲ Ͷ1͸
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤʹ͸ͷ Ͷ1͸
   Free‐market	ideology ǦͲǤʹͷͲ Ͷʹ1
 New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤͷ1Ͳ Ͷʹ1
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤʹͷʹ Ͷʹ1
   Free‐market	ideology ǦͲǤʹ͹Ͳ ͵ͻͺ
 New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤͷ1Ͳ ͵ͻͺ
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤͶͷ1 ͵ͻͺ
   Free‐market	ideology ǦͲǤ͵͸Ͳ Ͷʹ1
 New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤͷ͹Ͳ Ͷʹ1
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤͶͻͺ Ͷʹ1
   Free‐market	ideology ǦͲǤͶͶͲ Ͷ͵͵
 New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤ͸͹Ͳ Ͷ͵͵
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤͷͺͷ Ͷ͵͵
   Free‐market	ideology ǦͲǤʹ1Ͳ ͵1ͻ
 New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤͷ͹Ͳ ͵1ͻ
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤ͵͵ͷ ͵1ͻ
   Free‐market	ideology ǦͲǤ͵ͲͲ ͶͲͶ
 New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤͷͲͲ ͶͲͶ
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤͶͲͷ ͶͲͶ
   Free‐market	ideology ǦͲǤ͵͵Ͳ ͶʹͲ
ǟɥƐƎƏ6ɥ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(,(3#"ƥɥ++ɥ1(%'32ɥ1#2#15#"ƥɥ
11

 New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤ͸͹Ͳ ͶʹͲ
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤͷͶ1 ͶʹͲ
   Free‐market	ideology ǦͲǤͷͻͲ Ͷ11
 New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤ͹ͶͲ Ͷ11
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤ͸͵͹ Ͷ11
ǡǤǡǡǤȋʹͲ1͵Ȍ   Hierarchical	cultural	values ǦͲǤ͵Ͷ͸ ʹͺͶ
 Individualistic	cultural	values ǦͲǤʹͻ͸ ʹͻͶ
 New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤʹ͵͸ ʹͺͷ
 Policy	support ͲǤͶ1Ͳ ʹͺͶ
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤʹͲͷ ʹͺͶ
 Public	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤͶͺ͸ ʹͺͶ
 Subjective	knowledge ͲǤͲʹͶ ʹͺͶ
ǡǤǤǡǡǤǤǡǡǤǤǡǡǤǤǡƬ
ǡǤǤȋʹͲ1ͶȌ
  Prioritize	environment	over	
economy	
ͲǤ͵͵Ͳ ʹ͸Ͳ1
 Public	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤʹͲ͵ ʹ͸Ͳ1
ǡǤǤǡǡǤǤǡǡǤǤǡǡǤǤǡƬ

ǡǤǤȋʹͲ1ʹȌ
  Activist/green	identity ͲǤͲͷ͸ 1ͲͲ1
 Hierarchical	cultural	values ǦͲǤ1ͶͲ 1ͲͲ1
 Individualistic	cultural	values ǦͲǤʹͷ͵ 1ͲͲ1
 Policy	support ͲǤ͵͹ͷ 1ͲͲ1
 Prioritize	environment	over	
economy	
ͲǤ͵Ͳ1 1ͲͲ1
ǡǤǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ1͵Ȍ
   Private	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤ1ͺ͵ ʹ1ͺͶ
ǟɥƐƎƏ6ɥ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1ʹ

Public	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤ͵͹ͺ ʹ1ͺ1
	   Private	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤʹͶ1 1͹ͺ1
 Public	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤͶͻʹ 1͹͹Ͷ
ǡǤǤǡǡǤǤǡǡǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ11Ȍ   Perceived	scientific	consensus ͲǤͶͲ͹ ʹ͹ͺ
 Policy	support ͲǤͶʹ͹ ʹ͹ͺ
 Subjective	knowledge ͲǤͲͻ͸ ʹ͹͹
 Trust	in	scientists ͲǤͷͷͻ ʹ͹ͺ
ǡǤǡǡǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ1ʹȌ   Experience	of	local	weather	change ͲǤͷͷͷ 1ͺ
 Objective	knowledge ǦͲǤͲͺͺ 1ͺ
ǡǤǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ1ͶȌ   Experience	of	local	weather	change ͲǤͶ͵Ͳ ͵͹ʹ
 Prioritize	environment	over	
economy	
ͲǤʹͻͲ ͵ͻͲ
ǡǤǡǡǤǡǡǤǡǡǤǡǡ
ǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ11ȌƬǡǤǡǡǤǡ
ǡǤǡǡǤǡƬǡǤ	ǤȋʹͲ11ȌƬ
ǡǤǡǡǤǡǡǤǡƬǡǤ	Ǥ
ȋʹͲ11ȌƬǡǤǡǡǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ1ʹȌ
  Activist/green	identity ͲǤʹͶͺ ʹʹʹͷ
Experience	of	extreme	weather ͲǤͲ͸ͷ ʹʹ͹ʹ
Perceived	scientific	consensus ͲǤͶͺ͸ ʹ1ͻͷ
Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤʹͶʹ ʹͲͻ͹
 Schwartz	values:	Biospheric ͲǤ11͹ 1ͷͷͺ
ǡǤǡǡǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ1ʹȌ   Activist/green	identity ͲǤ1͹1 1͹͵
 New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤͶ͹͵ 1͹͵
 Perceived	scientific	consensus ͲǤ1͵ͻ ͺͻ
ǡǤȋʹͲ1ͲȌ   Private	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤ1͸ͺ 1ͲͶͲ
 Schwartz	values:	Biospheric ͲǤʹͶͺ 1Ͳ͵ͻ
ǡǤǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ1ʹȌ  
 Experience	of	extreme	weather ͲǤͲͷ͹ 1͸1ͺ
ǟɥƐƎƏ6ɥ!,(++-ɥ4 +(2'#12ɥ(,(3#"ƥɥ++ɥ1(%'32ɥ1#2#15#"ƥɥ
1͵

 Experience	of	local	weather	change ͲǤͲ͵ʹ ͸͹ʹ͸
ǡǤǤǡƬǡǤǤȋʹͲ1͵Ȍ   Activist/green	identity ͲǤ͸ͻʹ ʹ͸Ͳ
 Policy	support ͲǤͷ͹͸ ʹ͸Ͳ
 Support	for	carbon	tax/cap	and	
trade	
ͲǤͷ1Ͳ ʹ͸Ͳ
ǡǤǤǡǡǤ
ǤǤǡǡǤǤǡƬ
ǡǤǤȋʹͲ1͵Ȍ
 
 Private	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤ1ʹ1 1Ͷͺ
 Subjective	knowledge ͲǤʹ͹͵ 1Ͷͺ
	ǡǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ11Ȍ
1  
 Trust	in	scientists ͲǤ͵͹ͻ ͻ͹
ʹ  
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤͶ͵1 ͶͶ
 Trust	in	scientists ͲǤͶͲ͹ ͶͶ
	ǡǤǡǡǤǤǡǦǡǤǡƬ
ǡǤȋʹͲ11ȌƬǡǤǡǡǤǡƬ
ǦǡǤǡȋʹͲͲͺȌƬǡǤǡǡǤǤǡ
ǦǡǤǡǡǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ1͵ȌƬǡ
ǤǤǡǡǤǤǡǦǡǤǡǡǤǡƬ
ǡǤȋʹͲ1͵ȌƬǡǤǡǡǤǡ
ǡǤǤǡƬǦǡǤȋʹͲ11Ȍ
   Hierarchical	cultural	values ǦͲǤʹ͹͸ ʹ1͵ͺ
 Individualistic	cultural	values ǦͲǤ͵͵Ͷ ʹ1͵Ͷ
 Perceived	scientific	consensus ͲǤ͵Ͷ͵ ʹ1͵͸
 Prioritize	environment	over	
economy	
ͲǤͶͶͲ ʹͲͻͲ
 Public	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤ1ͻ͹ 1ͺ͸ͷ
 Public	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤʹͶ͹ ʹͲͻͺ
	ǡǤǤǡƬǡǤǤȋʹͲ1ͲȌ  
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤ͵ͷͷ ͹Ͷ
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1Ͷ

 Support	for	carbon	tax/cap	and	
trade	
ͲǤ͵͹ͻ ͹Ͷ
	ǡǤǤǡǡǤǤǡƬǡǤǤ
ȋʹͲ11Ȍ
  Policy	support ͲǤ͸͵͵ ͵͵
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤͶͺ͹ ͵͵
 Public	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤͶͻ͹ ͵͵
 Support	for	carbon	tax/cap	and	
trade	
ͲǤͶʹͻ ͵͵
	ǡǤǡ
ǡǤǡǡǤǡǡǤǡǡǤǡ
ǡǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ1ʹȌ
  Subjective	knowledge ͲǤͲͻͻ ͶͶ͹
	ǡǤǡǡǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ1ʹȌ   Private	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤͶʹͻ Ͷ͵͹
 Public	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤͷʹͲ ͶͶ1

ǡǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ1ʹȌ
1   Prioritize	environment	over	
economy	
ͲǤʹʹʹ 1ͻͶ
Public	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤͲͻ1 1ͻͶ
ʹ   Prioritize	environment	over	
economy	
ͲǤ1ͷ͵ 1ʹ͸
Public	pro‐env.	behavior ǦͲǤͲ1ͷ 1ʹ͸

ǡǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ1͵Ȍ   Public	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤͷͲ͸ ʹ͹

ǡǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ1͵Ȍ   Perceived	scientific	consensus ͲǤͶͷʹ ʹ1͹
 Prioritize	environment	over	
economy	
ͲǤͶʹͻ ʹͷͻ
 Public	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤ1ͶͶ ͻͻ


ǡǤǡǡǤǡƬǦǡǤȋʹͲ1ʹȌ  
 Activist/green	identity ͲǤ1͹͹ ʹͶ͸
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1ͷ

 Experience	of	extreme	weather ͲǤͲ͹1 ʹͶ͸
 Experience	of	local	weather	change ͲǤ1ͺͶ ʹͶ͸

ǡǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ11Ȍ   Prioritize	environment	over	
economy	
ͲǤʹʹ͵ ͸Ͷʹ
 Subjective	knowledge ͲǤͲͶ1 ͸Ͷʹ

±ǡǤȋʹͲ1ʹȌ
1 	 
 Environmental	cues ͲǤ͵͹͵ ͸Ͳ
Experience	of	local	weather	change ͲǤͷ͹͸ ͸Ͳ
ʹ 	 
 Environmental	cues ͲǤ͸ʹͲ ͸Ͳ
 Experience	of	local	weather	change ͲǤ͸Ͳ͹ 1ͷͲ
ǡǤǤǡǡǤǤǡǡǤǡǡǤǡƬǡ
ǤǤȋʹͲ1ʹȌ
  Experience	of	local	weather	change ͲǤʹʹʹ 1͵ͺ
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤͶ11 1ͷ1
¡ǡǤƬǡǤȋʹͲ1͵Ȍ   New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤͷ͵͹ 1Ͳ͵
 Perceived	scientific	consensus ͲǤ͵ʹͷ 1Ͳ͵
ǡǤǤȋʹͲ1ʹȌ   Objective	knowledge ͲǤ͵Ͳ͹ ʹͲͲ͸
 Subjective	knowledge ͲǤͲ͹1 ʹͲͲ͸
ǡǤǤǡǡǤǡǡǤ
ǤǡƬǡ	ǤǤ
ȋʹͲ1ͶȌ
  Subjective	knowledge ͲǤͲͻͺ 1ͲͲͷ͹

ǡǤǤǡƬǡǤǤȋʹͲ1͵Ȍ   Environmental	cues ͲǤͲʹͷ ͷ1ͺͻ
 Subjective	knowledge ͲǤ1ͲͲ ͷʹ1ͷ
ǡǤǡƬ
ǡǤȋʹͲͲ͸Ȍ   Free‐market	ideology ǦͲǤͶ͵Ͳ 1ͺͷ
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤͶͷͲ 1ͺͷ
ǟɥƐƎƏ6ɥ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1͸

 Subjective	knowledge ͲǤ1͹Ͳ 1ͺͷ
ǡǤǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ1ͲȌ   Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤʹͲ͸ ͺͶ
ǡǤǡǡǤǤǡƬǡ	ǤȋʹͲ1ͶȌ   Activist/green	identity ͲǤͲ͵ͺ ͻͶ͹
 Experience	of	extreme	weather ͲǤ1͹ʹ ͻͶ͹
 Experience	of	local	weather	change ͲǤ1͹Ͳ ͻͶ͹
 Private	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤͲ͹͵ ͻͶ͹
 Public	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤʹͲ͸ ͻͶ͹
ǡǤǤǡǡǤǤǡǡǤǤǡǡǤǡǡ
ǤǤ
ǤǡǡǤǡǤǤǤ
ǡǤǤȋʹͲ1͵Ȍ
   Activist/green	identity ͲǤͶͷͲ ͵Ͳͻ͸
 Experience	of	extreme	weather ͲǤͲͲͻ ͵Ͳͻ͸
 Objective	knowledge ͲǤ͵͸Ͳ ͵Ͳͻ͸
 Policy	support ͲǤʹͺͶ ʹͻͲ͸
 Private	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤ͵Ͷ1 ͵Ͳͻ͸
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤͶͶͶ ͵ͲͶ͹
 Trust	in	scientists ͲǤͶ͸Ͳ ͵Ͳͻ͸
   Activist/green	identity ͲǤʹͻͻ Ͷʹʹʹ
 Experience	of	extreme	weather ͲǤͲͲ͸ ͶʹͶ͸
 Experience	of	local	weather	change ͲǤ͵͵1 ͶʹͶ͸
 Objective	knowledge ͲǤʹ͸͹ ͵ͺͶ͹
 Perceived	scientific	consensus ͲǤͶͻ͵ ͶʹͶ͸
 Private	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤ1ʹͲ ͶʹͶ͸
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤͶʹͷ Ͷ1͹͵
ǟɥƐƎƏ6ɥ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1͹

 Trust	in	scientists ͲǤͶ͹͵ ͶʹͶ͸
ǡǤǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ1͵ȌƬǡǤǡ
ǡǤǡǦǡǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ11Ȍ
  Hierarchical	cultural	values ǦͲǤʹ͹1 ͻ͸ʹ
 Individualistic	cultural	values ǦͲǤʹ͹ʹ ͻ͸ʹ
 Perceived	scientific	consensus ͲǤ͵ʹͶ ͻͻ͸
 Prioritize	environment	over	
economy	
ͲǤͶͷ͵ ͻ͹͸
 Public	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤʹͲͶ ͺͷʹ
 Public	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤ͵Ͳ͵ ͻ͸͹
ǡǤǤȋʹͲ1͵Ȍ   Policy	support ͲǤͷ͹ͻ ʹͶͻ
ǡǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ1͵Ȍ   Experience	of	local	weather	change ͲǤͷ͸͹ Ͷ͵
 Policy	support ͲǤʹ͸ʹ Ͷ͵
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤʹ͵͵ Ͷ͵
 Support	for	carbon	tax/cap	and	
trade	
ͲǤʹͶͻ Ͷ͵
 Trust	in	scientists ͲǤ͸Ͳ͵ Ͷ͵
ǡǤǡǡǤǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ1ͲȌ
1  
 Environmental	cues ͲǤʹͶͲ ͻ͵
Experience	of	local	weather	change ͲǤͶ͸1 ͻ͵
Schwartz	values:	Biospheric ͲǤͲ1Ͷ ͻ͵
ʹ  
 Environmental	cues ͲǤʹ͸͵ Ͷʹ
Experience	of	local	weather	change ͲǤ͸ʹ͹ Ͷʹ
Schwartz	values:	Biospheric ͲǤͷ͵͸ Ͷ1
͵  
 Experience	of	local	weather	change ͲǤͷ͸Ͷ 1ͷͻ
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1ͺ

 Schwartz	values:	Biospheric ͲǤͶͻͶ 1ͷͻ
 Support	for	carbon	tax/cap	and	
trade	
ͲǤ͸ͲͶ 1ͷͻ
ǡǤǡƬǡǤǤȋʹͲ1ͶȌ  
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤʹ͹ͷ ͸ͻ
 Trust	in	scientists ͲǤͷͶͺ ͸ͻ
ǡǤǤǡƬǡǤǤȋʹͲͲͻȌ   Activist/green	identity ͲǤͲͶͶ ͸ͻͻ
ǡǤǤǡǡǤǤǡƬ
ǡǤǤȋʹͲ1ʹȌ
1   Policy	support ͲǤͶͻ͵ ͻͶ
ʹ   Policy	support ͲǤʹͲͻ 1Ͳͻ
͵   Policy	support ͲǤʹͲʹ 1͹ʹ
ǡǤǤǡǡǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲͲͺȌ   New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤͶ͵͹ 1ͲͲͶ
 Subjective	knowledge ͲǤͲ͹1 1ͲͲͶ
 Trust	in	scientists ͲǤ1͹1 1ͲͲͶ
ǡǤȋʹͲ11Ȍ 
  Experience	of	extreme	weather ͲǤͲ1ʹ Ͷʹ͵
ǡǤǤǡǡ
ǤǡǡǤǡƬǡǤǤ
ȋʹͲ11Ȍ
   Hierarchical	cultural	values ǦͲǤͲͶͶ ʹͺͷ
Subjective	knowledge ͲǤͲͷ͹ ʹͺͺ
   Hierarchical	cultural	values ǦͲǤ1͸ʹ Ͷ1Ͷ
 Subjective	knowledge ǦͲǤͲͲͻ Ͷʹͻ
ǡǤȋʹͲ1͵Ȍ   New	Environmental	Paradigm ͲǤ͵͵͸ Ͷͷ͸
 Policy	support ͲǤʹͺʹ Ͷͻ1
 Private	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤ1ͷ1 Ͷͻ1
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤ1ͺ͵ Ͷͻ1
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1ͻ

 Subjective	knowledge ͲǤͲͺ͹ Ͷͻ1
 Support	for	carbon	tax/cap	and	
trade	
ͲǤʹʹ͹ Ͷͻ1
ǡǤǡǡǤǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ1ʹȌ  
 Public	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤ1ͺͶ 1Ͳ͹͹
 Support	for	carbon	tax/cap	and	
trade	
ͲǤ1͸1 1Ͳ͸ʹ
 Trust	in	scientists ͲǤͶ1͵ 1ͲͻͶ
ǡǤǡǡǤǡƬǦǡǤȋʹͲ1ͲȌƬ
ǡǤǡǡǤǤǡǦǡǤǡǡǤǡ
ƬǡǤȋʹͲ1͵Ȍ
  Hierarchical	cultural	values ǦͲǤʹͻ͸ ͻͶͺ
 Individualistic	cultural	values ǦͲǤ͵͸͵ ͻͶͺ
 Perceived	scientific	consensus ͲǤ͵ͻ͵ ͻ͹͹
 Prioritize	environment	over	
economy	
ͲǤͶͷ͸ ͻͷͻ
 Public	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤ1͸Ͷ ͺ1Ͳ
 Public	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤʹͶͲ ͻ͵Ͳ
ǡǤǡǡǤǡǦǡǤǡ	ǡ
Ǥǡ
ƬǡǤȋʹͲ1ʹȌ
  Hierarchical	cultural	values ǦͲǤ͵ʹ͵ 1Ͳ1͹
 Individualistic	cultural	values ǦͲǤ͵1Ͷ 1Ͳ1͹
 Perceived	scientific	consensus ͲǤʹͺͶ 1Ͳ͸1
 Prioritize	environment	over	
economy	
ͲǤͶͶ͸ 1Ͳͷ͹
 Public	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤʹͲ͹ ͻ͵͸
 Public	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤ͵͵͵ 1Ͳͷʹ
ǡǤǡǡǤǡǦǡǤǡ	ǡ
Ǥǡ
ƬǡǤȋʹͲ1͵Ȍ
  Hierarchical	cultural	values ǦͲǤ͵ͲͶ 1ͲͲ1
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ʹͲ

 Individualistic	cultural	values ǦͲǤ͵Ͳ1 1ͲͲ1
 Perceived	scientific	consensus ͲǤ͵͵ʹ 1Ͳ͵ʹ
 Prioritize	environment	over	
economy	
ͲǤͶ1Ͷ 1Ͳ͵1
 Public	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤ1͹͹ ͻ1͸
 Public	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤ͵ͷͺ 1Ͳ͵Ͳ
ǡǤǡǡǤǡǦǡǤǡ	ǡ
Ǥǡ
ƬǡǤȋʹͲ1ͶȌ
  Hierarchical	cultural	values ǦͲǤ͵͵Ͷ ͻͺͲ
 Individualistic	cultural	values ǦͲǤ͵ʹͻ ͻ͹͹
 Perceived	scientific	consensus ͲǤ͵ͺ͵ 1ͲͲ͹
 Prioritize	environment	over	
economy	
ͲǤͶͻͻ 1ͲͲͷ
 Public	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤʹͲ͸ ͺͺͶ
 Public	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤ͵ʹ͸ 1ͲͲ1
ǡǤǡǡǤǡǦǡǤǡ	ǡ
Ǥǡ
ǡǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ1ͶȌ
  Perceived	scientific	consensus ͲǤͶͲͲ ͺ1ͺ
 Prioritize	environment	over	
economy	
ͲǤͷ1ͻ ͺ1Ͳ
 Public	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤʹͻʹ ͹͵Ͳ
 Public	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤ͵Ͷͺ ͺ1Ͳ
ǡǤǡǡǤǡǦǡǤǡ	ǡ
Ǥǡ
ǡǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ1ͶȌ
  Perceived	scientific	consensus ͲǤ͵͹1 1ʹ͹ͷ
 Prioritize	environment	over	
economy	
ͲǤͶͷ͵ 1ʹ͸ͺ
 Public	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤʹ1Ͳ 111͹
 Public	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤ͵Ͷ͵ 1ʹ͹1
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ʹ1

ǡǤǡǡǤǡǦǡǤǡƬ
ǡǤǤȋʹͲ1ʹȌ
  Hierarchical	cultural	values ǦͲǤʹͺ͸ ͻ͹͹
 Individualistic	cultural	values ǦͲǤ͵Ͳ͸ ͻ͹͸
 Perceived	scientific	consensus ͲǤʹ͵ͷ 1ͲͲͲ
 Prioritize	environment	over	
economy	
ͲǤͶͲͺ ͻ͹Ͳ
 Public	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤ1ͻͶ ͺͺͺ
 Public	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤʹͻ1 ͻͺ͵
ǡǤǡǡǤǡǦǡǤǡƬǡǤ
ȋʹͲ1ͲȌ
  Hierarchical	cultural	values ǦͲǤ͵Ͷͻ 1ͲͲ͵
 Individualistic	cultural	values ǦͲǤ͵͵Ͷ 1ͲͲʹ
 Perceived	scientific	consensus ͲǤ͵Ͳʹ 1Ͳ1ͺ
 Prioritize	environment	over	
economy	
ͲǤͶ͹ͷ 1ͲͲ1
 Public	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤʹʹ͸ ͺ͸1
 Public	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤʹͻ͸ ͻͻͶ
ǡǤǡǡǤǡǡǤǡǡǤǡƬǡ
ǤȋʹͲͲͺȌ
  Experience	of	local	weather	change ǦͲǤͲͲͺ ͹͵ʹ
 Hierarchical	cultural	values ǦͲǤͲͷͺ ͹͵ͻ
 Individualistic	cultural	values ͲǤ1ʹ͹ ͹Ͳ͹
 Policy	support ͲǤͲͺͺ ͹ʹ1
 Perceived	scientific	consensus ͲǤͲ͸͸ ͹ͷͶ
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤͲ͸ͺ ͸͸͸
 Public	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤͲ͸Ͳ ͹ͶͲ
ǡǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ1ʹȌ   Private	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤ͵ͻ1 ʹͷ͸ͷ
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ʹʹ

ǡǤǡ
ǡ
ǤǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ1͵Ȍ
1   Perceived	scientific	consensus ͲǤͶ͵Ͳ ʹͲͲ
ʹ   Perceived	scientific	consensus ͲǤ͸ͻͻ 1ͲͲ
ǡǤǡǡǤǡƬ
ǡ
ǤǤȋʹͲ1͵Ȍ   Free‐market	ideology ǦͲǤͷʹͲ 11Ͷͷ
ǡǤǡǡǤǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ11Ȍ
1  
 Environmental	cues ͲǤʹͶͷ ͷͺʹ
1  
 Environmental	cues ͲǤ1͵ͻ ʹͻͲ
ʹ  
 Environmental	cues ͲǤͲͻͺ ʹͷ1
 Private	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤ1͹Ͳ ʹͷ1
ǡǤȋʹͲ1͵Ȍ   Private	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤͲ͸͵ ʹʹ͵
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤ1ͶͲ ʹʹ͵
 Public	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤͲ͹Ͷ ʹʹ͵
 Support	for	carbon	tax/cap	and	
trade	
ͲǤͲʹͷ ʹʹ͵
ǡǤǡǡǤǡƬǡ
ǤǤȋʹͲ1ͶȌ   Objective	knowledge ͲǤͷ͸͵ ʹ͹1
ǡǤǡƬǡ
ǤǤȋʹͲ1ʹȌ   Objective	knowledge ͲǤʹͺ͵ ͷͷ
ǡǤǡƬǡ
ǤǤȋʹͲ1͵Ȍ   Objective	knowledge ǦͲǤͲ͸ͻ ͺͷ
ǡǤǡǡ
ǤǤǡƬǡǤǤȋʹͲ1͵Ȍ   Objective	knowledge ͲǤͲ͸͸ 1͹ʹ
ǡǤǡǡǤǤǡƬǡ
ǤȋʹͲͲͻȌ
ʹͲͲ͸   Perceived	scientific	consensus ͲǤʹͻ1 ͻ͹͹
 Subjective	knowledge ͲǤ1ʹ1 ͻͺ͹
 Trust	in	scientists ͲǤʹͻͲ ͻͺʹ
ʹͲͲ͹   Perceived	scientific	consensus ͲǤʹͺͺ ͻ͸ʹ
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ʹ͵

 Subjective	knowledge ͲǤͲ͸͵ ͻͻ͵
 Trust	in	scientists ͲǤ͵ʹͲ ͻͺʹ
ǡǤǤȋʹͲ1ʹȌ
1  
 Perceived	scientific	consensus ͲǤͶ͹͸ ͷͻͲ
ʹ   Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤʹ͸1 ͵1Ͷ
ǦǡǤǡǡǤǡǡǤǤǡ
ǡǤǤǡǡǤǡƬǡǤǤȋʹͲ11Ȍ
  Support	for	carbon	tax/cap	and	
trade	
ͲǤͷ͸͹ 1͸͸
ǡǤǤǡǡǤǡǡǤ
ǤǡǡǤǤǡƬ
	ǡǤȋʹͲ1͵ȌƬǡǤ
ǤǡƬǡǤȋʹͲ1͵Ȍ
  Policy	support ͲǤͶͶ1 ͸ʹ͸ͻ
 Private	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤ1ͺͺ ͸͵1͹
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤʹ͹1 ͸͵ʹ͹
 Schwartz	values:	Biospheric ͲǤʹͶʹ ͸͵͵Ͷ
ǡǤǡǡǤǡƬǡǤǤȋʹͲ1͵Ȍ   Perceived	scientific	consensus ͲǤ͵ͷͺ 1ʹͲͲ
 Policy	support ͲǤͶ͸͹ 1ͶͲ͵
 Private	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤ11͵ ͺͷͷ
 Private	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤ1͵͹ 11͵Ͳ
 Public	pro‐env.	behavior ͲǤʹ͹͵ 1͵ͺʹ
 Public	pro‐env.	intentions ͲǤʹͻͶ 1ͶͲͶ
ǡǤǡǡǤǡǤȋʹͲͲ1ȌǤ Ƭ

 Policy	support ͲǤʹ1͸ ʹʹͲ
 Support	for	carbon	tax/cap	and	
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